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1.  INTRODUCTION
A job well done takes a motivated worker. Employers  realize this, and may attempt to
influence the working morale of their employees. One important instrument in this
connection is the wage. It may be a good idea to pay a high wage if this makes an employee
grateful and prone to work in ways beneficial to the employer. A lower wage, even if it does
not make the employee quit his job, may be regarded as an insult which is met with less
conscientious vocational effort. Even in tight labour markets, when unemployment is high,
employers may be reluctant to reduce wages for this reason.
This picture is confirmed by scholarly work in many fields. It is accounted for in
numerous interview studies that economists have conducted with business leaders [e.g. Agell
&  Lundborg (1995, 1999),  Bewley (1995, 1998), Blinder & Choi (1990), Campbell &
Kamlani (1997),  Kaufman (1984)]. It is supported by laboratory studies of experimental
labour markets [e.g. Fehr & Falk (1998), Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl (1993, 1998)]. It is in
line with discussions in organization theory [e.g. Dessler (1986), Lawler (1994), Steers &
Porter (1991)] and psychology [e.g. Adams (1963), Argyle (1989)]. This work suggests that
the driving force behind the results concerns reciprocal motivation￿people desire to be kind
to anyone they conceive of as kind and to hurt anyone who is unkind. In the case at hand, a
worker who receives a high wage thinks of his employer as kind, and the worker is kind in
return by exerting lots of effort. Employers avoid hiring people at low wages, foreseeing that
this would be conceived of as unkind behaviour that is met with shirking.
In a series of important contributions, Akerlof (1982), Akerlof & Yellen (1988, 1990)
investigate the economic consequences of such behaviour. However, in their work a positive
wage-effort relationship is postulated, so one may wonder if such behaviour will actually
emerge endogenously in a model which takes reciprocal motivation as its basic premiss. In a
recent paper,  Rabin (1993) develops techniques for incorporating reciprocity into game
theory and economics. His model is meant to highlight and illustrate qualitative features that2
are unique to reciprocity though. The model abstracts from information about the sequential
structure of a strategic situation, and is therefore not suitable for application to situations with
interesting dynamic structures. In a game where decisions about wage offers, hirings and
working efforts are taken in turn, the model would not yield sensible predictions.
In Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998) we develop a theory of reciprocity which is
designed for the analysis of the impact of reciprocity on economic problems.
1 The theory is
directly inspired by Rabin’s work, but works for extensive games in which the sequential
structure of a strategic situation is made explicit. It captures well the intuitive meaning of
reciprocity in situations with a non-trivial dynamic structure, as well as many qualitative
features of experimental evidence. In this paper, we apply our model to a wage-setting game
played by an employer and two workers. We show that when the workers are motivated by
reciprocity, in equilibrium the players’ behaviour is indeed consistent with the
aforementioned results.
Inspired by experimental results, there also exist approaches designed to investigate
not reciprocity, but distributional concerns. These models permit decision makers not only to
be motivated by their own payoff, but rather by the final distribution of payoffs. A particular
class of these models that have been applied to wage setting games incorporate a desire for a
fair allocation, i.e. a person's utility is decreasing in the difference between the own payoff
and that of the partner [see e.g. Bolton & Ockenfels (1999), Fehr,  Kirchsteiger &  Riedl
(1998), Fehr & Schmidt (1999)].
2 While these fairness approaches are capable of explaining
many experimental results,
3 their application to the problem of wage undercutting seems to
                                                       
1 Confer also Falk & Fischbacher (1998) who propose a different approach to modelling reciprocity.
2 Another prominent approach assumes that players are altruistic [e.g. Anderson, Goeree & Holt (1998),
Andreoni (1990)]. Altruism seems important for understanding behaviour in many cases (e.g. public goods
games), but is seldom discussed in relation to to wage-setting games. This is probably because, given the
empirical and experimental findings related above, it would be unreasonable to imagine that a worker who
receives a low wage behaves altruistically towards the firm.
3 See, however, Blount (1995), Bolle & Kritikos (1998), Charness (1996), and Gneezy, Güth & Verboven
(1998) for experimental results that cannot be explained by distributional concerns.3
be more problematic. In most experiments all plausible fairness standards demand the same,
namely an equal split allocation (although, of course, subjects do not always behave
accordingly). In actual labour relationships, however, it is not clear how to compare the
payoff of a firm with the payoff of its workers, and which standards of distributive justice to
apply. Should the wages be compared to the profit? If yes, what is a "fair" relation between
wages and profits? If no, what else should be compared? Should shareholders' payoffs arising
from an increase in stock-prices be taken into account? Is the gross or the net wage relevant
for the comparison? On top of these unsolved questions the information necessary to make
"fairness" evaluations is not available in many cases. Typically, profits of firms as shown in
the balance-sheet are shaped by tax avoidance and stock-price considerations. Hence, they
often do not reflect the "true" profits of a firm, and accordingly workers have no good
information about it. Similarly, workers are often not informed about labour taxes imposed
on the firms. Consequently, workers very often do not even know what their firms have to
pay for their labour, i.e. they do not know their actual gross wage. All these informational
problems as well as the ambiguities about the relevant fairness concept makes the use of
models of distributive justice problematic for the analysis of labour relations.
On the other hand, firms and workers normally know very well the range of possible
wages. Hence, they can easily assess the firm's kindness when paying a specific wage.
Similarly, the range of possible working efforts, and the kindness of a specific effort level,
can be easily evaluated. Hence, contrary to fairness norms, the reciprocity principle￿be kind
to those who are kind to you￿can be easily applied to the analysis of wage undercutting.
Section 2 recapitulates the theory of Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998). In Section 3,
we apply the theory to two wage-setting games played by an employer and two workers.4
2. THE MODEL
Modelling reciprocity requires special tools. To see this, note first that in standard games any
player i’s payoff function ui can be written in the form
(1) ui: AﬁR
where A is the set of strategy profiles of the game￿the payoff of a player only depends on
the strategies chosen by him and the other players. We claim that this is not a rich enough












The payoffs in G are in Euros (c), and do not necessarily represent the players preferences
which are affected also by reciprocity. Player 1 may  Split c50 equally  between the two
players, or Let player 2 decide on the allocation of c100. Player 2 can choose Left and let 1
have all the money, or Right and claim it for herself. We now derive some insights about the
players preferences if these capture concerns of reciprocity.
Suppose player 2 wants to be kind to 1 if she believes 1 is kind, and to be unkind
otherwise. To determine her best choice, she must hence figure out if 1 is kind or unkind
choosing Let. So, is Let a kind choice? We argue that this depends on player 1’s beliefs.
Suppose player 1 believes player 2 will choose Right. Effectively, by choosing Let player 15
believes he gives a payoff of c100 to player 2, which can be compared to the mere c25 player
2 gets if 1 chooses Split. Hence, one may conclude that player 1 is kind if he chooses Let.
However, by an analogous argument, one must conclude that 1 is unkind if he chooses Let
while believing that 2 will choose Left. In this case, 1 would believe that by choosing Let
instead of Split he reduces 2’s monetary reward as much as he can.
The upshot here is that to find out 2’s preferences between the choices Left and Right
we must know 2’s belief about 1’s kindness. And since 1’s kindness depends on 1’s belief,
we must effectively know 2’s belief about 1’s belief about 2’s choice. Note that it is not
possible to find out 2’s preference by looking simply at the payoff vectors reached after
different choices are made. Hence a standard game theoretic payoff function of the form (1)
can not describe 2’s preferences. We need a richer formulation of the kind
(2) ui: A·BiﬁR
where Bi is the sets of beliefs (about choices and beliefs) that player i may hold, somehow
described￿the utility of i does not only depend on the strategies chosen by him and the other
players, but also on his beliefs. A general framework for incorporating payoff functions of
this form into strategic analysis is psychological game theory, introduced by Geanakoplos,
Pearce &  Stacchetti (1989).  Rabin (1993)  utilizes this toolbox to develop a theory of
reciprocity for normal form games, and in Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998) we develop an
extensive form theory in the same spirit. We refer to that paper for a detailed description, and
here cut some corners and just outline the key ideas.
Each player i is assumed to choose a strategy that maximizes his utility ui defined as
(3) ui = pi + Yi￿Sj„i (kij￿liji)6
Here  pi is player  i’s “material payoff” which represents some objectively measurable
quantity, for example Euros as in the previous example. The term Yi ￿Sj„i (kij￿liji) is player
i’s “reciprocity payoff”. Yi is a non-negative parameter describing  i’s sensitivity to
reciprocity. The higher is Yi, the more sensitive to reciprocity concerns is i. The factor kij
represents i’s kindness to j. It is measured by comparing the material payoff that i believes
that j gets to the set of material payoffs that i believes that j could get were i to choose
differently than he does. Exemplified with the game G, and assuming that 1 believes that with
probability 9/10 player 2 chooses Right: If 1 chooses Split then 1 believes 2’s material payoff
will be  c25. If 1 chooses  Let then 1 believes 2’s (expected) material payoff will be
c100*9/10+0*1/10 = c90. By choosing a mixed strategy 1 could  make 2’s material payoff
correspond to any value in the set [c25, c90]. The midpoint, c57.50, determines the border
between kindness and unkindness. Since c90>c57.50 1 is kind by choosing Let, and the exact
measure of his kindness in this case is kij = c90-c57.50=c32.50. The factor liji represents i’s
belief about how kind j is to i. This belief is measured just the same way as the kindness kji,
except that one has to “move up” a level in the belief hierarchy: Just like kji is concerned
with a choice by j, liji is analogously concerned with a belief of i about a choice by j. Just
like kji concerns a belief by j about a choice by i, liji is concerned with a belief of i about a
belief by j about a choice by i.
The specification of i’s utility captures reciprocity in that i wants to make kij match
the sign of liji, other things being equal. Of course, when i optimizes he may have to make
tradeoffs between various reciprocity payoffs with respect to different players as well as his
material payoff.
The players’ beliefs may differ at different junctures of the game tree. If beliefs7
change, so may the players’ motivation, since reciprocal motivation depends on beliefs. Let r
be the root of a subtree of an extensive game. Let ui(r) be the utility of player i calculated as
in (3), except that all choices and beliefs are updated to reflect the fact that r is reached. To
exemplify, look at the game G and suppose u1 and u2 are calculated using the following data:
•  The strategy profile played is a=(Split, Left)
•  Each of player 1 and 2 believes that profile a is played
•  1 and 2 believe the other player believes that profile a is played
Here the beliefs are  correct. Utilities are  well-defined also with incorrect beliefs, but in
equilibrium (cf. below) beliefs this cannot happen, why the example is convenient. We get
(4)  u1  =  p1 + Y1￿k12￿l121  =  25 + Y1￿(25-12.50)(25-25) =  25
(5)  u2  =  p2 + Y2￿k21￿l212 =  25 + Y2￿(25-25)(25-12.50)  =  25
Let r be the node where 2 moves. u1(r) and u2(r) are calculated using the following data:
•  The strategy profile played is a(r)=(Let, Left)
•  Each of players 1 and 2 believes that profile a(r) is played
•  1 and 2 believe the other player believes that profile a(r) is played
The profile/beliefs are as before, except concerning choices on the path to r. We get
(6)  u1(r) =  100 + Y1￿(0-12.50)(100-50)  =  100 - Y1￿625
(7)  u2(r) =  0 + Y2￿(100-50)(0-12.50) =  -Y2￿6258
In  Dufwenberg &  Kirchsteiger (1998) we define a solution concept called  Sequential
Reciprocity Equilibrium (henceforth SRE). Intuitively this concept requires that each player i
maximizes his utility ui given his correct beliefs. Moreover, it requires optimization by all
players in all subgames. If the strategies and beliefs of all players are updated conditional on
the root r of some subgame was reached, then each player still maximizes his utility ui(r).
Although this has been a somewhat impressionistic account of our theory, it should be
clear that the strategy profile (Split, Left) is not an SRE in the example. On the presumtion
that (Split, Left) is an SRE (matched by correct beliefs), if 2’s subgame were reached she
would have a profitable deviation to  Right  that would render her the  utility
u2*(r)=100+Y1￿(0-100)(0-12.50), which is greater than u2(r)=-Y2￿625.
However, in Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998) we prove that there always exist a
SRE. In the next section we apply the SRE concept to two wage-setting games and study how
a firm responds to wage undercutting when the workers are motivated by reciprocity.
3. WAGE UNDERCUTTING
Imagine a situation where two workers compete to get a job available in a firm. The firm
decides whom to hire, and the hired worker then decides about how hard to work. Such a
situation can be modelled as a three stage game:
Stage 1: Two applicants make simultaneously wage demands. For simplicity, we assume that
a wage demand w can only take two values: w ˛{wL,wH} with wL<wH.
Stage 2: The firm F accepts one of the demands, denoted by wA. By that it hires applicant A.
Stage 3: A chooses his work effort eA, which influences the value of his employment to the
firm. For simplicity reasons, we assume that eA can only take two values: eA˛{eL,eH}, eL<eH.
Connected with the effort levels are the effort costs cL and cH that A has to bear. The cost of9
the high effort level is higher than the cost of the low effort level. To get an interesting
problem, we have to assume that (eH-eL) is larger than (cH-cL)￿the net surplus increases in
the effort level. Otherwise, the high effort level does not pay anyhow.
The firm's profits pF(wA,eA) are increasing in the effort level provided by the worker,
and decreasing in the wage the firm has to pay. Specifically, we assume that pF(wA,eA)=eA-
wA. Disregarding reciprocity motivation, the worker's payoff is increasing in the wage he
receives and decreasing in the effort cost. His material payoff is given by pA(wA,eA)=wA-cA.
The material payoff of the rejected applicant is normalized to be zero, and we assume the
outside option is equally good as getting a low wage and exerting low effort level
(pA(wL,eL)=wL-cL=0).
4 Hence, receiving a low wage for a high effort is worse than the
outside option (0>pA(wL,eH)=wL-cH).
To allow for Pareto improvements, we assume wage levels are such that the worker as
well as the firm gain in terms of material payoff if the high wage is paid for high effort
instead of the low wage for low effort (pA(wH,eH)>pA(wL,eL), pF(wH,eH)>pF(wL,eL)) Hence, a
low wage–low effort combination is neither in the interest of the worker nor the firm. Yet, in
the standard subgame perfect equilibrium where reciprocity plays no role a low wage–low
effort combination results. The hired worker chooses the low effort level, irrespectively of the
wage he receives. Hence, the firm accepts a low wage demand if feasible.
If the applicants are motivated by reciprocity the outcome is different:
5
Result 1: In every SRE it holds that:
a)  If the firm accepts a low wage demand, the hired worker chooses the low effort level.
                                                       
4 This holds if it is always possible for a rejected applicant to find a low wage-low effort job somewhere else.
5 In what follows the results are driven by the applicants reciprocity motivation towards the firm. If also firms
were reciprocally motivated the equilibria we describe would still be valid (and also the firm would experience a
reciprocity payoff). Furthermore, the analysis is not affected by an applicant's reciprocity feelings towards the
other applicant. For expositional ease (and perhaps also because it is realistic) we proceed the analysis assuming10
b)  If the firm accepts a high wage demand, the hired worker chooses the high effort level,
provided that he is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity, i.e. if Y>2cH/[(wH-cH)(eH-eL)].
The intuitive reason for this result is simple:
6 Suppose, contrary to Result 1a, that a low wage
demand is accepted and that the worker responds with a high effort. In equilibrium beliefs are
correct, so the firm must expect a high effort by the worker. This, however, means than the
firm treats the hired applicant unkindly, since the firm believes the hired applicants payoff
will be lower than zero￿the payoff from remaining unemployed. The worker therefore wants
to be unkind to the firm in return, and so chooses the low effort level, which is a
contradiction. Analogous reasoning shows that if a high wage demand is accepted by the firm
the applicant is treated kindly even if the firm expects a high effort. A worker sufficiently
inclined to reciprocity reacts with a high effort choice. Note that the inclination to reciprocity
required to get this result is increasing in the high effort costs, decreasing in the wage, and
decreasing in the marginal effect of the effort increase.
We now restrict our attention to the interesting case where a high effort is enforcable
(i.e., Y>2cH/[(wH-cH))(eH-eL)]), in which case the firm's equilibrium choice is given by
Result 2: If Y>2cH/[(wH-cH)(eH-eL)], in every SRE the firm accepts a high wage demand
whenever this is available.
Since a high wage worker provides a high effort, the firm’s profits are higher if it accepts a
high wage demand than a low one. A low wage destroys "working morale", so the firm does
not accept it￿wage undercutting does not improve employment prospects.
                                                                                                                                                                           
a standard profit maximising firm and no reciprocity concerns between the applicants. Furthermore, we look at
the case where both applicants are equally motivated by reciprocity, so that Yi=Y for any worker i.11
We now consider a different situation. Imagine that one worker, the insider, is already
employed at the high wage wH, and that an outsider wants to get the insider’s job. Such a
situation can again be modelled by a three-stage game:
Stage 1: The outsider demands a wage wO, which can be high or low (wO˛{wL,wH}).
Stage 2: The firm F accepts or rejects the demand. If it accepts, the outsider is hired at the
wage wO. The (former) insider is then fired and receives the value of the outside option,
assumed to be zero. If the firm rejects the outsider’s demand, the insider remains employed at
the wage wH. The outsider then remains unemployed, and receives a payoff of zero.
Stage 3: The employed worker, denoted again by A, chooses high or low effort eA˛{eL,eH}.
We make the same assumptions about effort costs and material payoffs as before, with one
addition: If the firm hires the outsider, it has to bear a strictly positive, but arbitrarily small
hiring costs T (0<T< wH-wL).
7 It is easy to see that again the subgame perfect equilbrium
without reciprocity leads to an inefficent low wage–low effort combination. However, if the
insider and the outsider are motivated by reciprocity, the outcome is different:
Result 3: In every SRE it holds that:
a) If the firm accepts a low wage demand, the hired outsider chooses the low effort level.
b) If the firm accepts a high wage demand, the hired outsider chooses the high effort level,
provided that he is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity, i.e if Y>2cH/[(wh-cH)(eh-el)].
c) If the firm rejects the outsider‘s demand, the employed insider chooses a high effort,
provided that he is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity, i.e if Y>2cH/[(wH-cH)(eH-eL)].
Result 4: If Y>2cH/[(wH-cH)(eH-eL)], in every SRE the firm does not hire the outsider.
                                                                                                                                                                           
6 We do not present any formal proofs, but such are available from the authors upon request.12
Due to the reciprocity the insider provides the high effort, whereas the outsider provides the
high effort for the high wage and the low effort for the low wage (see Result 3). Hiring the
outsider at the high wage is then sub-optimal for the firm, given the hiring cost T.
8 On the
other hand, accepting the low wage demand is also not optimal since this would lead to a low
effort. Hence, wage undercutting does not improve an outsider’s employment prospects.
Results 3 and 4 rest on the assumption that the insider‘s wage is not negotiable. If the
insider’s wage is flexible, we are back to the framework of Results 1 and 2, where￿as we
have already seen￿wage undercutting is not a promising strategy to get a job. Hence, our
main conclusion remains valid irrespectively of whether the wages of the already employed
insiders are downward rigid (e.g. by agreements with trade unions) or flexible.
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